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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 990863-CA
vs.
TROY DALE ROTHE,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellee.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has Jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a3(2)(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in convicting the defendant of theft based solely on the
defendant's presence at the scene of the crime, his knowledge that the crime was being
committed, and his "looking around" while the items were being stolen. "When reviewing
a bench trial (in a criminal case) for sufficiency of evidence, (the appellate court) must
sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975 P.2d 501, 502 (Utah App. 1999).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the text of the
1

brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Troy Dale Rothe appeals from the judgment, sentence, and commitment imposed by
the Honorable Howard H. Maetani after a bench trial at which Rothe was acquitted of the
charge Public Intoxication and convicted of Retail Theft, a class B misdemeanor.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Rothe was charged by information filed in the Fourth District Court, American
Fork Department with Retail Theft, a class B misdemeanor, and with Public Intoxication, a
class C misdemeanor. At his arraignment on, Rothe plead not guilty to both counts. A
bench trial, the Honorable Howard H. Maetani presiding, was held on June 23, 1999 at
which Rothe was acquitted of public intoxication and convicted of retail theft.
Rothe was sentenced on November 16, 1999 to 30 days in the Utah County Jail, a
fine and surcharge of $200.00, and was placed on probation for 12 months.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On December 21, 1998, Dale Nichols, an employee of Smith's grocery store in
American Fork saw Lee Barringer and Troy Rothe in an aisle of the store and observed
Barringer putting items in his pockets. While this was happening, Rothe looked up and
down the aisle. The two moved to another aisle, and Nichols followed. Again, Barringer
put items in his pockets, as Rothe looked up and down the aisle. (R. 5 at 6; 6 at 2).
Nichols contacted two other Smith's employees for help, and they stopped Barringer
and Rothe at the front of the store. (R. 8 at 22). Barringer resisted the employees'
2
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The trial court enhanced the m i n i m u m
•

presence of the two other

defendants while they planned the crime and when they boasted of committing the crime.
This Court held that even though the defendant boasted of committing the crime and was in
the presence of the person who committed the crime and even boasted of the crime, there
was nevertheless insufficient evidence to impose the sentencing enhancement statute:
"[m]ere presence, or even prior knowledge, does not make one an accomplice when he
neither advises, instigates, encourages, or assists in perpetration of the crime." Id.
(quoting State v. Kerekes. 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980)).
The Utah Supreme Court has used this same rationale in the context of constructive
possession of illegal substances. Constructive possession may be found when there is a
"sufficient nexus between the accused and the drug to permit an inference that the accused
had both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug." State
v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). The Court listed factors that would determine
when that sufficient nexus is established; however, the court also stated that the facts "must
raise a reasonable inference that the defendant was engaged in a criminal enterprise and not
simply a bystander." Id at 320.
In Terry v. Zions Co-Op Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), the Court
considered whether being in the presence of a shoplifter can be enough to support probable
cause for arrest or detention, concluding that mere presence is insufficient to establish
probable cause. Terry was a civil case involving false arrest, in which he Court stated,
The presence of a person in the company of one suspected of a crime does not as a
matter of law establish probable cause for the arrest of that person. Circumstances
and facts sufficient to constitute probable cause to arrest or detain a person must
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exist independently from the mere association of individuals. While the association
may be a contributing factor in the overall determination, it standing alone cannot
be the exclusive basis for probable cause to arrest or detain someone." Terry, at
321.
In a more recent case, this Court reversed a conviction for contributing to the
delinquency of a minor where the conviction was based on the defendant's presence at a
party where minors were drinking, though the defendant knew the minors were consuming
alcohol in violation of the law. State v. Terwilliger. 1999 WL 1041183 (Ut. App. 1999).
The Court cited several cases that stand for the proposition that presence does not equal
intent:
The trial court in this case, however, made no finding indicating defendant had
some measure of control over the minors' consumption of alcohol. Instead, the trial
court based its ruling on the fact that defendant simply witnessed two minors in his
presence consuming alcohol. We believe the plain language of section 78-3a-801
does not sustain the prosecution or conviction of a defendant who, at most, merely
sees others violate the law. Cf. State v. Fertig, 120 Utah 224, 228, 233 P.2d 347,
349 (1951) ("Mere presence combined with knowledge that a crime is about to be
committed . . . will not of itself constitute one an accomplice."); State v. Krueger,
975 P.2d 489, 495 (Utah Ct.App. 1999) (stating section 78-3a-801(l)(a)(ii) requires
"the State . . . to prove . . . the defendants intended for the children to chew the
tobacco."), cert, granted, 1999 Utah LEXIS 141 (July 26, 1999) (No. 990362);
State v. Labrum. 959 P.2d 120, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (" 'Mere presence, or
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even prior knowledge, does not make one an accomplice when he neither advises,
instigates, encourages, or assists in perpetration of the crime.' " (quoting State v.
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980))); Commonwealth v. Fields. 460 Pa.
316, 333 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. 1975) ("[M]ere presence at the scene of a crime is not,
in itself, sufficient to establish that one is an active partner in the intent of another
to commit the crime.").
Although Rothe was looking around while Barringer took items from the shelves,
this cannot be seriously seen as evidence that Rothe had acquired the intent necessary to
commit retail theft. He could have been looking around because he was innocently
nervous-knowing what Barringer was doing and afraid that he would be implicated in the
crime. See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 976 (Utah App.1988) ("nervous conduct...
when confronted by a Utah Highway Patrol trooper is consistent with innocent as well as
with criminal behavior").
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Rothe respectfully requests that this court reverse his conviction for retail theft due
to the insufficiency of the evidence presented at trial.
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief to
the Appeals Division to Duval, Hansen, Witt, & Morley, 306 W. Main Street, American

Fork, UT 84003, on this 27th day of March, 2000.
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even prior knowledge, does not make one an accomplice when he neither advises,
instigates, encourages, or assists in perpetration of the crime.' " (quoting State v.
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Utah 1980))); Commonwealth v. Fields. 460 Pa.
316, 333 A.2d 745, 747 (Pa. 1975) (M[M]ere presence at the scene of a crime is not,
in itself, sufficient to establish that one is an active partner in the intent of another
to commit the crime.").
Although Rothe was looking around while Barringer took items from the shelves,
this cannot be seriously seen as evidence that Rothe had acquired the intent necessary to
commit retail theft. He could have been looking around because he was innocently
nervous-knowing what Barringer was doing and afraid that he would be implicated in the
crime. See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 976 (Utah App.1988) ("nervous conduct...
when confronted by a Utah Highway Patrol trooper is consistent with innocent as well as
with criminal behavior").
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Rothe respectfully requests that this court reverse his conviction for retail theft due
to the insufficiency of the evidence presented at trial.
Dated March 30, 2000.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief to
the Appeals Division to Duval, Hansen, Witt, & Morley, 306 W. Main Street, American
Fork, UT 84003, on this 27th day of March, 2000.
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ADDENDUM
No addenda are needed.
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